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Executive
summary

Executive summary

A study on
Roadmaps
towards
Sustainable
Energy futures
( RoSE )
exploring energy demand
and supply uncertainty

An exploration of uncertainty on drivers of
energy demand and supply is indispensable
for better understanding the prospects of
long-tern climate stabilization.
The RoSE study is the first of its kind to
systematically explore the impact of economic
growth, population and fossil fuel scarcity,
in scenarios with and without climate policy,
using a model ensemble. A feature of RoSE is
the participation of five established integrated
assessment modelling teams from three
important regions in international climate
policy negotiations: the EU, the USA and China.

5

Economic
growth and
fossil fuel
availability as
drivers of CO2
emissions
Economic growth

Neither slow nor rapid economic growth solves
the climate problem by itself.
In the absence of climate policy and if energy
intensity improvements continue along historical trends, higher economic activity implies
higher energy demand and greenhouse gas
emissions. The increase in energy and carbon
intensity improvements with higher economic
growth is overcompensated by the larger
growth in per capita income. Even under slow
economic growth assumptions, GDP will rise
significantly above today’s level, leading to an
increase in greenhouse gas emissions.
Fossil fuel availability

Fossil fuel scarcity is insufficient to slow global
warming significantly.
Low fossil fuel availability leads to levels of
greenhouse gas emissions that are higher than
those under climate change stabilization.
Nevertheless, fossil fuel availability significantly influences the energy mix and the C O 2
emissions in scenarios without climate policy.
Energy use

There are robust patterns in projections of
energy use in the absence of climate policy.
Higher economic growth increases the scale
of the energy system, which continues to be
mostly supplied by fossil fuels. Structural differences in the energy supply mix occur for variations in fossil resource availability, particularly
coal and oil supply. Models unanimously show
an electrification of energy end use independently of economic growth and fossil resource
assumptions.

6
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Requirements
of climate
stabilization
Emissions phase out

Carbon prices and mitigation costs

Climate stabilization requires a phase out
of global greenhouse gas emissions in the
long run.

Variations in economic growth and
fossil fuel availability can alter carbon prices
and mitigation costs substantially.

For a stringent stabilization target compatible with the 2 °C goal (a level of 450 ppm CO2
equivalent in the atmosphere), net emissions
have to be nearly phased out by 2100. For a less
ambitious, but still stringent stabilization level
of 550 ppm CO 2 e, emissions would need to be
more than halved by the end of the century,
and decline towards zero in the 22nd century.

A supply push of fossil energy can be more
easily neutralized with a carbon price signal
than a demand pull due to higher levels of
economic output. Thus, carbon prices vary
more strongly with growth projections than
with fossil fuel availability. Mitigation cost
estimates are sensitive to economic growth
and fossil fuel assumptions. Costs increase
by approximately 30 to 100 % from low to
high economic growth, and from low to high
fossil fuel availability.

Energy systems transformation

Climate stabilization implies a fundamental
transformation of global energy systems.
Climate stabilization requires a transformation
to a low carbon energy system in the 21st century
with historically unprecedented decarbonization rates. Models tell different stories when
and what to reduce, but some robust patterns
emerge. On the supply side, coal is rapidly
replaced with non-fossil energy sources.
On the demand side, models foresee a larger
share of electricity and gases coupled with a
strong reduction of solids. The structure of the
energy transformation is largely unaffected by
variations in fossil fuel availability and economic growth. The effect of fossil fuel availability on fossil fuel use is negligible in climate
stabilization scenarios. Thus, climate policy
effectively limits uncertainty about future fossil
fuel use.

Executive summary

Fragmented
and delayed
climate action

7

Regional
perspectives

weak policies

China

Current climate policies are insufficient
for 2 ° C stabilization

Climate stabilization implies a fundamental
energy transformation for China.

With the currently planned climate policies
and pledged emissions reductions the world is
not on track towards the 2°C target. If current
trends of weak and globally uncoordinated
climate policies continue, global mean temperatures are likely to increase by more than
3°C by 2100.

Carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion
in China are expected to double from 2005 levels by 2020. Different assumptions on climate
policy driven carbon intensity reductions lead
to a large range of 6-12 Gt CO 2 emissions by
2050, as calculated with an energy system
model of the Chinese economy ( China-TIMES
model ). Climate stabilization scenarios from
global models show emissions in China below
or at the low end of this range in 2050. The
emission trajectories differ across models but
all peak during 2020-2025 for the 450 ppm CO2 e
target and 2025-2030 for the 550 ppm CO 2 e
target. This indicates that stringent climate
targets would imply ambitious emission reductions in China.

Delayed Action

Delaying action greatly increases the
challenge of keeping warming below 2 ° C.
In case of a further delay in the implementation of comprehensive global emissions
reductions the transformation effort needs to
be compressed into a shorter period of time.
These higher emission reduction rates required
in such later-action scenarios imply, inter alia,
i) faster decarbonization of the energy system,
ii) faster reductions of energy demand, iii)
more stranded investments due to pre-maturely retired fossil capacities, and iv) higher
transitory economic losses during the phasein of climate policies. The implications of
delaying action until 2030 are considerably
more severe than those of a delay until 2020.
While the models are able to compute
low-stabilization scenarios with a prolonged
delay of action, the dramatic increase in
mitigation challenges in case of policy
delay until 2030 make it seem unlikely that
such pathways can be implemented in the
real world.

Africa

The rates of economic and population growth
in Africa have profound implications for energy
use and greenhouse gas emissions.
Today Africa accounts for a modest 3% of global
energy system CO 2 emissions. The evolution
of Africa’s emissions over the coming century
depends critically on future population and
income. Absent any climate policy, Africa could
become a major emitter in the second half of
the 21st century if economic growth in this part
of the world is steady.
In the shorter term, the extent of energy
poverty and improvements in access to modern
energy in Africa are also driven by assumptions
regarding future population and economic
growth. Slower economic growth and larger
population growth result in a significantly
slower transition to modern energy access and
use on the continent.

8
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Sectoral
perspectives
Energy resource markets

L and use

Climate policies have a strong impact on
energy resource markets, resource rents and
energy security.

Population, economic growth, and fossil fuel
scarcity all have implications for land use.

Climate policies interfere with fossil fuel markets and reallocate rent incomes from providing scarce goods. The global losses of fossil fuel
rents are overcompensated by revenues from
carbon pricing. The losses of rents from coal are
much smaller than those for oil, though coal
is the fossil fuel that needs to be reduced the
most. Achieving the 2°C target still allows using
conventional and unconventional oil reserves.
Large part of the coal reserve needs to be left
underground.
Energy security is significantly improved by
climate policy under all assumptions about resource availability and GDP growth. That is due
to a reduction of risks associated with energy
trade and an increase in the resilience of energy
systems through higher diversity. Climate policy
also makes total energy supply, the energy mix
and energy trade more predictable and possibly
easier to manage. Climate policies may also
entail certain risks for energy security. In particular, deep penetration of solar energy in the
electricity sector or biofuels in the liquid fuels
sector may reduce the diversity of these energy
systems by the end of the century.

Larger populations require more food, increasing the extent of cropland area. Wealthier
populations tend to eat more meat, a landintensive commodity, increasing cropland and
pasture cover. Growing, wealthier populations
also demand more energy. Fossil fuel scarcity
drives increased consumption of bioenergy
and land devoted to its production. All three
of these effects lead to reductions in forest
cover and increases in land-use change
CO 2 emissions.
Investments and innovation

Economic growth and fossil fuel scarcity can
both stimulate clean energy innovation and
non-fossil-fuel investments.
When economies grow faster energy resources
are used more efficiently, but fossil fuels would
remain the prevalent source of energy.
In contrast, the expectation of high energy
prices could redirect ample financial resources
to R&D programs aimed at developing new
energy sources.
Although economic growth and fossil fuel
prices can create an economic opportunity
for more investments in non-fossil energy technologies and clean energy R&D, still they would
lag behind the levels observed in stabilization scenarios and would not induce emission
reductions compatible with climate stabilization objectives. On average, baseline total R&D
investments amount to about 67 billion 2005
US$/yr while they increase to almost twice as
much ( 113 billion 2005 US$  /yr) in the 450 ppm
C O2 e stabilization scenario. The availability
of cheap gas resources would increase gas
investments, mostly to substitute coal especially in coal-intensive countries. Yet, it would
only marginally displace investments in clean
energy innovation.
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A study on
Roadmaps towards
Sustainable
Energy futures
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A study on Roadmaps towards Sustainable Energy futures

A broad and systematic exploration of
uncertainty on key drivers of energy demand
and supply is indispensable for better understanding the prospects of achieving long-tern
climate protection targets. The RoSE study is
the first of its kind to systematically explore
the impact of economic growth, population,
and fossil resource scarcity on baseline and
climate policy scenarios in a model ensemble.
The aim is to provide a robust picture on
energy sector transformation scenarios for
reaching ambitious climate targets. That is
achieved by assessing the feasibility and
costs of climate mitigation goals across
different reference assumptions, different
policy regimes, and different models
The RoSE project has several unique features
that distinguish it from past integrated
assessment model comparison projects and
frame the project objectives:
• Participation of established integrated
assessment modeling teams from three
important regions for climate policy making:
the EU, the USA and China ( Box 1 –1 ).
• Exploration of a large scenario space
defined by a range of reference assumptions
and climate policy stabilization targets.
• Harmonization of key input assumptions
in order to provide a better understanding on
the effect of input versus model assumptions.
• Analysis of the future development of the
Chinese energy system by both global and
regional modeling.
• Participation of domain experts in the
areas of energy security, transportation,
fossil fuel availability, and access to electriity,
with the aim to embed scenarios and model
results in a larger context beyond model
boundaries.

RoSE is in the process of producing a large
scenario data base and a series of research
papers that can serve as a key input to international climate policy assessments, like the
IPCC 5th Assessment Report.
Uncertainty regarding future population
growth, economic development and fossil
fuel availability, and its implications for
climate policy are crucial for the climate
debate. This uncertainty is explored and
quantified in RoSE by means of baseline and
policy scenarios (Box 1–2). The specification
of the RoSE scenarios is based on three key
dimensions:
• underlying assumptions on future
socio-economic development determined
by population and economic growth;
• reference assumptions on long-term fossil
fuel availability and accompanying extraction
costs, with a focus on variations of coal,
oil, and gas;
• stringency and timing of climate protection
targets and framework of international
climate policy.

A study on Roadmaps towards Sustainable Energy futures

Box 1-1
Models participating
in RoSE

China TIMES: The China Times model
is a dynamic linear programming
energy system optimization model
which has been adopted to study
China’s future energy development
strategy. Times incorporates the full
range of energy processes and it is
able to consider existing technologies as well as advanced technologies which may be deployed in the
future. The objective function of the
model minimizest energy system
costs. Five sectors, namely agriculture, industry, commercial,
residential (divided into urban and
rural) and transportation are
considered. The China Times energy
model is used to determine the
least-cost mix of technologies and
fuels to meet the predicted energy
service demands until 2050.
GCAM: GCAM is a dynamicrecursive model of the coupled
global energy-economy-landclimate system. GCAM tracks
emissions and concentrations of
15 greenhouse gases and shortlived species. An important feature
of the GCAM is that energy,
agriculture, forestry, and land
markets are integrated with the
extent of unmanaged ecosystems
and the terrestrial carbon cycle.

Box 1-2
RoSE Scenarios

Population and GDP: Models were
harmonized to the medium
population projection from the 2008
Revision of the UN World Population
Prospects (peaking at 9.4 billion in
2070). The GDP scenarios build on
the population projections and
encompass assumptions regarding
both the speed of economic growth
(slow, medium or fast speed) and
the convergence characteristics
(slow or fast convergence) between
26 aggregate world regions. The
study also included a slow growth –
slow convergence GDP scenario that
was based on the high population
projection of the UN 2008 Revisions
(increasing to 14 billion in 2100).
Fossil fuel availability: Fossil fuel
availability was characterized in
terms of supply curves describing
extraction costs as a function of
cumulative extraction. Oil, gas and
coal have been treated separately,

IPAC: IPAC is a global multi-model
framework that links social and
economic development, energy
activities and land use activities,
and enables a full analysis of
emissions. IPAC includes mainly four
parts: (1) the society, economy and
energy activities module, which
mainly analyzes energy demand and
supply , and determines energy
prices; (2) the energy technology
module, which analyzes the short
and mid-term energy utilization
technologies under different
conditions, and determines the
energy demand under different
technology compositions; (3) the
land use module, which analyses the
emissions from land use processes;
(4) the industrial processes
emissions module, which mainly
analyzes the emissions from all kinds
of industrial production.
REMIND: The global multi-region
model REMIND is an inter-temporal
energy-economy-environment
model which maximizes global
welfare based on nested regional
macro-economic production
functions. REMIND incorporates a
detailed description of energy
carriers and conversion technologies,
and allows for unrestricted

with an additional division into
conventional and non-conventional
resources. Historical data for
recovery rates have been examined
and then extrapolated, under
varying assumptions about
technological progress and
extraction costs. The output of this
process was three extraction cost
curves, assuming ‘low’, ‘medium’,
and ‘high’ resource availability, for
each of the three fossil resources.
Climate Policy: The policy dimension
includes different policy cases
representing the level of ambition
and timing of climate-policy:
• Baseline: no climate-policy;
• 450 ppm CO 2 e: adoption of a
450 ppm CO 2 equivalent concentration stabilization target allowing
for overshoot, with full when-wherewhat flexibility of emissions
reductions after 2010;
• 550 ppm CO 2e: adoption of a

11

inter-temporal trade relations
and capital movements between
11 world regions. Mitigation costs
estimates are based on technological opportunities and constraints
in the development of energy
technologies.
WITCH: The WITCH model developed by the climate change
modelling and policy group at FEEM
is a global integrated assessment
model in which the non-cooperative
nature of international relationships is explicitly accounted for. The
regional and intertemporal
dimensions of the model make it
possible to differentiate climate
policies across regions and over
time, and thus consider several policy scenarios. The model includes a
wide range of energy technology
options, with different assumptions
on their future development, which
is also related to the level of
innovation effort undertaken by
countries. Special emphasis is put
on the emergence of carbon-free
backstop technologies in the
electricity and the non-electricity
sectors, and on endogenous
improvements in energy efficiency
triggered by dedicated R&D
investments.

550ppm CO 2e target, with no
overshoot allowed, and full flexibility
of emissions reductions;
• Weak Policies: initially world
regions take only moderate and
uncoordinated action following the
lower end of the Copenhagen
commitment until 2020. In the
different scenarios, either that level
of ambition is retained throughout
the 21st century, or a 450ppm CO2e
long term stabilization target
allowing for overshoot is adopted
in 2020 or 2030.
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Economic growth
and fossil fuel
availability
as drivers of
CO2 emissions

Economic growth and fossil fuel availability as drivers of CO2 emissions

(a) Gross world product and
(b) final energy use over the
21st century; (c) CO2
emissions from fossil fuel
combustion and industry
( FF&I ) and (d) per capita
final energy consumption
as a function of per capita
income.
Fast growth
Default
Slow growth

In general, higher economic growth leads
to higher energy demand and greenhouse gas
emissions ( Figure 1 ). Final energy demand in
2100 was projected to range between two to
three times of today’s level ( 700 –1000 Exajoule
[ EJ ] ). These levels correspond to assumptions
about global economic output in 2100 ranging
between 4 to 12 times of today’s level.
Energy demand variations are significantly
smaller because models assume progressive
energy intensity improvements with GDP per
capita growth. Models agree that those energy
intensity improvements – in the absence of
dedicated policies to improve energy intensity
beyond historical trends – are not large enough

to fully compensate per capita income growth.
Consequently, a steady increase of final
energy use both over time (as the economy
grows) and from low to high growth scenarios
is observed across models.
Carbon intensity of energy production
is correlated with economic growth to a
much lesser degree than energy intensity.
In the absence of climate policies, it remains
fairly constant over time so that the growing
energy demand is converted into growing
emissions for both slow and high growth
scenarios. Economic growth thus cannot
solve the climate problem by itself as sometimes suggested.

(a) Gross world product

(b) Final energy use
1100

600
1000
500

FS Gr

FS Gr 900
Final Energy [EJ]

Figure 1 *1

Neither slow nor rapid economic
growth solves the climate problem
by itself
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(d) Final energy consumption per capita
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Final energy use per capita [GJ/yr]

CO2 FF&I emissions per capita [tCO2/yr]

(c) CO2 emissions from FF&I

*1 Individual funnels show the
range across three different
models (GCAM, WITCH, and
REMIND) for a given assumption
about economic growth
(denoted by the color coding).
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Economic growth and fossil fuel availability as drivers of CO2 emissions

2.2

Fossil fuel scarcity is insufficient to
slow global warming significantly

Default
High fossils
Low fossils
Hi coal

G GCAM
R REMIND
W WITCH

(a) Oil prices and cumulative extraction

(b) Coal prices and cumulative extraction
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(c) CO2 emissions from FF&I
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Coal price [indexed to 2010]

(a) Oil and (b) coal prices
as a function of cumulative
extraction over the period
2010 ( bottom left corner )
to 2100 (model letters at
the end of the dashed
lines); (c) CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel combustion
and industry ( FF&I ) and
(d) final energy use over
the 21st century. *2

push from lower energy prices. High availability
leads to a more energy intensive production, and
vice versa, as shown by all models.
Carbon intensity is correlated with fossil fuel
availability. It will be lower for limited fossil fuel
supply, which requires substituting fossil fuels
with non-fossil energy carriers to a larger degree.
A higher fossil resource base can lead to lower
or higher carbon intensity. It may lower carbon
intensity if it allows a more extensive use of gas
substituting coal for electricity production and
a prolonged use of oil reducing the need for coal
to liquid technologies in the long run. However, if
the larger fossil fuel supply is dominated by coal,
carbon intensity can increase. Models estimate
that fossil fuel prices increase by a factor of five
to seven over the 21st century in a situation of low
fossil fuel availability, and only moderately
(~two fold) in the high fossil resource scenario.

Crude oil price [indexed to 2010]

Figure 2

Cumulative fossil fuel use ( 2010-2100 ) in the
absence of climate policy was estimated to range
from 54-61 Zetajoule [ ZJ ] for low fossil fuel availability, to 72-84 ZJ for high availability. This can
be compared with 18-19 Z J of fossil fuels used until 2010 and ca. 36 ZJ of proven fossil fuel reserves
today. The scenario of low fossil fuel availability
leads to a stabilization of emission levels around
2050 ( Figure 2 ). In the other cases, emissions
continue to increase in the 2nd half of the century.
Even if emission levels are stabilized in the 21st
century, atmospheric CO2 levels will continue to
rise. This is incompatible with the goal to stabilize
climate change. Thus, fossil resource scarcity
alone will not solve the climate problem.
Different assumptions about fossil resource
availability translate into differences in estimates
about future final energy demand (models project 700-1100 EJ in 2100). This is due to a supply
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*2 Individual funnels show
the range across three different
models (GCAM, WITCH, and
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impact of different assumptions
about fossil fuel availability
(denoted by the color coding).

CO2 FF&I emissions [GtCO2/yr]

90

60
50
40

Hi

700
600

30
500

20

400

10

300

0
2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

Year

2070

2080

2090

2100

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

Year

2070

2080

2090

2100

Economic growth and fossil fuel availability as drivers of CO2 emissions

2.3

There are robust patterns in
projections of energy use in the
absence of climate policy
Higher economic growth increases the
scale of the energy system, which continues
to be mostly supplied by fossil fuels.
Structural differences in the energy supply mix
occur for variations in fossil resource availability, particularly coal and oil supply ( Figure 3 ).
Models unanimously show an electrification of energy end use independently of
economic growth and fossil resource assumptions. The move towards electrification is
amplified if fossil resources are scarce.
In contrast, large oil and gas resources allow

Figure 3 *3
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(a) Primary energy supply in 2100

Structural changes in
(a) primary energy
supply for different
assumptions about
fossil fuel availability
and (b) final energy
over time.

more extensive use of liquids. Models also
show a robust pattern for primary energy
supply: a reduction of the share of oil & gas
use coupled with an expansion of non-fossils
and a modest expansion of coal use. Exceptions are i) the situation of high oil and gas
availability, where today’s mix of primary
energy carriers are basically maintained, ii)
low overall fossil fuel availability, where non
fossils are expanded much more strongly and
iii) high coal but low oil supply, where coal
use is increased significantly.

(b) Final energy consumption
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3

Requirements
of climate
stabilization

3.1

17

Climate stabilization requires
a phase out of greenhouse gas
emissions
Climate stabilization at levels of 450 ppm
or 550 ppm CO2e in the atmosphere requires
massive emissions reductions, in particular
in the latter half of the century (Figure 4). In
the 450 ppm case, greenhouse gas emissions
would need to be nearly phased out by 2100,
possibly requiring CO2 withdrawal from the atmosphere (negative emissions) to compensate
for residual emissions in non-energy sectors.
In the 550 ppm case, emissions would need to
be more than halved by the end of the century,
and declining towards zero in the 22nd century
The literature generally regards a stabilization level of 450 ppm CO2e as being compat-

No climate policy
550 ppm CO2e
450 ppm CO2e

ible with the 2 degrees target. All RoSE models
project global warming around or below 2
degrees in the 450 ppm case. In the 550 ppm
case, RoSE models show that temperature rises
above 2 degrees around 2050, and reaches ~2.4
degrees in 2100, with a slowly rising trend. If
greenhouse gas levels are not lowered in the
2nd half of the century, this would eventually
lead to an equilibrium warming of 3 degrees.
These estimates are based on the assumption
of a climate sensitivity of 3 degrees.
The results hold independently of the assumptions on future fossil resource availability
and economic growth.

(b) Kyoto gas emissions
120
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(a) CO2 emissions from FF & I
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Figure 4
(a) CO 2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion and
industry (FF&I), (b) Kyoto
gas emissions *4 , (c) total
anthropogenic radiative
forcing and (d) global mean
temperature increase since
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Requirements of climate stabilization

3.2

Climate stabilization requires a
massive transformation of the
energy system

Figure 5 *5
Decarbonization of
(a) primary energy supply
and (b) electricity production.
Coal

Climate stabilization requires a transformation to a low carbon energy system in the
21st century with historically unprecedented
decarbonization rates. This requires climate
policy intervention with carbon pricing at its
core. Increasing the stabilization target from
550 to 450 ppm C O2e considerably increases the
requirements on the decarbonization of energy
supply. Negative emissions due to bioenergy
use coupled with CCS are utilized in most model
runs to achieve the 450 ppm C O2 e target.
Models can tell very different stories when
and what to reduce. While there is broad agreement on Kyoto gas emissions reductions after
2040, large differences on CO2 fossil fuel and
industry emissions reductions are found.
However, some robust patterns in the description of the transformation process emerge

(Figure 5). Mitigation leads to a fast
phase out of coal and a rapid expansion of
non-fossils independently of assumptions
on economic growth and fossil fuel availability.
All models foresee a larger share of electricity
and gases coupled with a strong reduction of
solids in the energy demand structure, with
the largest share of energy coming from grids
in the latter half of the century.
The electricity mix shows the strongest
transformation, and the largest differences
between models. Models respond to climate
targets either with a dominant contribution
from nuclear or renewable electricity.
Compared to the impact of model differences,
the effect of different assumptions about
fossil fuel availability and economic growth
is small.

(a) Primary energy supply in 2050

(b) Electricity production in 2050
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Climate policy strongly constrains
fossil fuel use
Cumulative extraction is significantly
reduced in the climate policy cases (38-46 ZJ
in the 550 ppm and 26-37 ZJ in the 450 ppm
case). Climate policy strongly constrains the
variation of fossil fuel use with different

assumptions about fossil fuel availability as a
large amount of the resources has to remain
in the ground. Thus, uncertainty about future
fossil fuel use is effectively mitigated by
climate policy.

Requirements of climate stabilization

High fossils
Fast growth
Default
Slow growth
Low fossils

Mitigation pathways and carbon prices are
affected by assumptions on economic growth
and fossil fuel availability, as those lead to different levels of final energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of climate
policy. It matters whether these differences are
due to different levels of economic growth ( demand pull ) or fossil resource availability ( supply
push ). In the former case, carbon prices vary
more strongly (Figure 6). A supply push of fossil
energy may be more easily neutralized with a
carbon price signal than a demand pull due to
higher levels of economic output.
In an idealized setting of fully cooperative
action, foresight, and functioning energy and
land markets, a globally harmonized carbon
price will lead to emissions reductions when
and where they are most efficient. In this idealized context, global direct mitigation costs
are projected to be around or below 1% of economic output (that would have been obtained
in the absence of climate policy and climate
damages; in net present value terms) for

climate stabilization at 550 ppm CO2e across a
range of different assumptions about economic growth and fossil resource availability. This
cost measure does not include the benefits
from climate protection as well as ancillary
benefits from mitigation policies. For achieving the 450 ppm CO 2e target, mitigation costs
approximately double compared to the 550
ppm CO2e target. It is important to note that
mitigation costs can be substantially higher in
less idealized settings including multiple market externalities and distortions.
Assumptions about economic growth and
fossil fuel availability can alter mitigation cost
estimates substantially ( Figure 6 ). Mitigation
costs increase by approximately 25 to 80%
from low to high economic growth, and from
low to high fossil fuel availability. Low fossils
come in at the lowest cost due to the reduced
need of additional transformation under climate policy plus reduction of high fossil fuel
expenditures. High growth, high population
and high fossil scenarios sit on the high end.

(a) Carbon prices ( 450 ppm )

(b) Mitigation costs ( 450 ppm )
2.5
High fossils
Fast growth
Default
Slow growth
Low fossils
2
Net Present Value Losses (5% disc, 2010−2100) [% GDP]

Figure 6
(a) Net present carbon
prices and (b) policy costs
for the 450 ppm CO2e
stabilization target.

Variations in economic growth
and fossil fuel availability can
alter carbon prices and mitigation
costs substantially

Present Value Carbon Price (5% disc, 2010−2100) [$/tCO2]
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and delayed
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Fragmented and delayed climate action
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The international community set a target of limiting global
warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
However, as part of the Copenhagen Accord countries have only
committed to relatively weak near-term emissions reduction
pledges, and so far only few concrete climate policies and measures
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have been implemented.

4.1

Current climate policies are
insufficient for 2° C stabilization
By analysing scenarios in which national
emission reductions remain comparable
in ambition to the level implied by a
lenient interpretation of the Copenhagen
Pledges, we explored the consequences of
a continuation of current climate policy
trends. In all models we find that such

4.2

weak policies fail to prevent a further
increase of global GHG emissions at
least until mid-century, and are clearly
insufficient to meet the 2°C target.
Rather, global mean temperature rise by
about 3.5 ° C until 2100, with an increasing
trend moving into the 22 nd century.

Later action implies steeper
midterm emission reduction
requirements for reaching 2°C
In further scenario experiments, we explored how weak near-term climate policies
affect the challenges of reaching long-term
climate targets. To this end, we investigated
three variants of climate change mitigation
scenarios aiming at a stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2e
by 2100. As outlined above, stabilization at 450
ppm CO2e is roughly consistent with the 2°C
target. In the first set of scenarios, we assumed
global comprehensive emissions reductions to
start immediately ( IMMEDIATE ). In the second
set of scenarios ( WEAK-2020 ), we assumed
countries to follow the weak policy scenario until 2020, and to adopt comprehensive, globally
coordinated emissions reductions consistent
with the long-term target thereafter. Likewise,
the WEAK-2030 scenarios assume weak climate
policies until 2030, and comprehensive, globally
coordinated emissions reductions thereafter.
Comparing the results from these different
scenario sets allows us to explore how mitiga-

tion pathways and associated socio-economic
and technological challenges depend on the
start date of comprehensive global emissions reductions. Reaching the 450 ppm target
requires a fundamental transformation of
global energy systems, even if a global climate
agreement were reached immediately. We find
that delay of comprehensive global emissions
reductions increases the challenge of reaching stabilization levels consistent with the 2°C
target in several aspects. While aiming at the
same long-term greenhouse gas stabilization
levels, later action scenarios result in somewhat higher transitory climate change, and increase the likelihood of temporary overshooting
of the 2°C target. Delaying ambitious climate
policies results in a compression of the decarbonization effort into a shorter period of time,
with higher yearly emissions reduction rates
after adoption of the climate policy ( Figure 7 ).
The models estimate that GHG emissions have
to be reduced by 40 -60 % within one decade in
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Figure 7
Total global greenhouse gas
emissions for alternative
2050
climate policy scenarios.
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Climate policies in line with the 2°C target
render a considerable portion of conventional,
fossil-based energy supply capacities obsolete.
In case of a continuation of weak climate
policies, conventional fossil capacities increase
further, for instance because of the construction of coal-fired power plants. As a consequence, higher stranded investments due to
premature retirement of these capacities occur
( Figure 8d ).

case of the WEAK-2030 scenario, compared
to peak reduction rates of 20-30 % in the
IMMEDIATE scenario. Such high emission reduction rates are historically unprecedented. The
implications of pathways with prolonged delay
for global energy systems are dramatic. In the
model scenarios, this is accomplished by a
greatly accelerated decarbonization of energy
supply, rapid reductions of energy demand, or
a combination of both.
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The timing of emissions reductions also affects the economics of climate change mitigation ( Figure 8 ). While near-term economic
costs in the WEAK-2020 and WEAK-2030 scenarios
are small, long-term costs increase by 20-80%
compared to the IMMEDIATE scenario. These
scenarios are also characterized by higher longterm carbon price levels.
For all mitigation challenges analysed, we
find that implications of delaying action until
2030 are considerably more severe than of a
delay until 2020. In the WEAK-2030 scenario,
the shift from weak policies with low carbon
prices to comprehensive global climate regime

with high carbon prices and comprehensive
emissions pricing is likely to result in considerable economic distortions. All models find a
decrease of household income growth of about
0.4 % / yr in this scenario during the decade
following the phase-in of ambitious climate
policies. This short-term economic distortion
is much higher than in the other climate policy
scenario. While the models are able to compute
low-stabilization scenarios with a prolonged delay of action, the dramatic increase in mitigation challenges in case of policy delay until 2030
make it seem unlikely that such pathways can
be implemented in the real world.

(a) Long-term mitigation costs

(b) Short-term growth reduction
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Figure 8
The effect of weak
near-term climate policies
on (a) long-term mitigation
costs (aggregated
2035-2100), (b) economic
growth in the decade
following the implementation of stringent climate
policies, (c) mid-term
carbon price levels, and
(d) unused fossil capacities.
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Regional perspectives

5.1

Climate stabilization implies
a fundamental energy
transformation for China

Figure 9 *6

Carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion in China are expected to increase from
5.5 Gt CO2 in 2005 to about 11 Gt CO2 by 2020.
Different assumptions on climate policy driven
carbon intensity reductions lead to a large
range of emissions by 2050 ( 6-12 Gt CO2 ), as
calculated with an energy system model of the
Chinese economy (China TIMES model) (Figure
9). Climate stabilization scenarios from global
models show emission reductions for China
below or at the low end of the 6-12 Gt CO2 range
in 2050. The emission trajectories differ across
models but all peak during 2020-2025 for the
450 ppm CO2e target and 2025-2030 for the 550
ppm CO2e target. This indicates that stringent
climate targets would imply ambitious carbon
intensity reductions in China. For the 450 ppm
CO2e target, all global models show more reductions during 2010-2050 than the most stringent
climate policy scenario in the China TIMES .
Based on results from IPAC , China could
make such a contribution to transitioning to a
2 °C world. Much focus should be given to the
progress on technology. Full effort/collaboration
on technology innovation/diffusion is crucial.
The mitigation cost could be low if mitigation
technologies are a driving force of economic
development.
When comparing global model results, including IPAC , with the national model results of
China TIMES, the global models illustrate greater
carbon mitigation potentials with lower cost.
This is mainly due to a substantial decrease of
energy demand in the climate policy scenarios,
and more rapid expansion of nuclear and renewable energy and CCS until 2050.
The path towards low carbon development
for China, a big developing country with high
total carbon emissions with still lower per capita
carbon emissions compared to industrialized
countries, includes challenges and opportunities. Substantial efforts may be required to
transform the economic development mode,
to speed up innovation, R&D, and deployment
of advanced low carbon technologies,
to strengthen institutions, to advocate low
carbon lifestyles, and to enhance international
cooperation.

TIMES
GCAM
IPAC
REMIND
WITCH
Baseline
Reference
C353040
C354040
C454040
C455050
450 ppm CO2e

GCAM
REMIND
WITCH
Fast growth
Default
Slow growth
High population

6* The China Times scenarios
C353040, C354040, C454040,
and C455050 represent different requirements on carbon
intensity improvements.
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5.2

Economic and population growth in
Africa have profound implications
for energy use and emissions

Figure 10 *7

Today Africa accounts for a modest 3 %
of global energy system CO2 emissions.
The evolution of Africa’s emissions over the
coming century depends critically on future
population and income. Estimates of population in 2100 in Africa vary dramatically,
with 2 billion more inhabitants in the UN High
population scenario than the UN Low
population scenario. Future income growth
is also uncertain.
Absent any climate policy, Africa could
become a major emitter in the second half of
the 21st century if economic growth in this
part of the world is steady. 2100 emissions in
Africa could be as much as 20% of global
CO2 emissions, with as much as 10% of global
emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa ( Figure 1 0 ).
In the shorter term, the extent of energy
poverty and improvements in access to
modern energy in Africa are also driven by
assumptions regarding future population
and economic growth. Slower economic
growth and larger population growth result
in a significantly slower transition to modern
energy access and use on the continent
( Figure 11 ). When climate mitigation is
undertaken, Africa shoulders larger emissions
reductions relative to baseline levels than
the world on average, regardless of future
population and income. However, the total cost
of climate policy depends critically on assumptions about emissions permit allocations.
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Sectoral perspectives

6.1

Climate policies have a strong
impact on energy resource markets

6.1.1

Climate policies reallocate fossil rent incomes
Climate policies have a strong impact on
fossil fuel markets and rent incomes. Rent
incomes refer to the profits of fossil owners
caused by the scarcity of exhaustible fossil fuels or by the revenues caused by carbon
pricing reflecting the exhaustible carbon
budget imposed by climate policy. Since both
are expressed in monetary value terms, they
can be directly compared and the changes in
rents between scenarios indicate the distributive impacts of policies. Under climate policy,
the global losses of fossil fuel rents are overcompensated by revenues from carbon pricing ( Figure 12 ). The losses of rents from coal
are much smaller than those for oil, though
coal is the fossil fuel that needs to be reduced
the most. In the 450 and 550 ppm CO2e

Net present value of carbon
and fossil fuel rents
(discounted at 5%).

Net present value of carbon and fossil fuel rents
Low Fossils

Figure 1 2

scenarios, a large share of coal reserves would
be left underground ( Figure 13 ). However,
conventional oil and gas reserves and
resources are utilized. Also the non-conventional oil reserve would go into production.
According to results from one of the models ( REMIND ), climate change stabilization at
450 ppm CO2e decreases fossil fuel rents over
the 21st century by 10-15.tril.US$. The loss of
fossil fuel rent is highest for the fast growth
and the low fossils scenarios. The additional
carbon rent exceeds the loss of fossil fuel rents
in all cases of economic growth and fossil fuel
availability ( ca. 20-25tril.US$ ). The largest
over-compensation is resulting in the high
fossils scenario, whereas the sensitivity to
long-term growth variations is less important.
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6.1.2

Climate policies increase energy security

Figure 1 4

Under all assumptions about resource
availability and GDP growth, climate policies
significantly improve energy security by reducing the risks associated with energy trade and
increasing the resilience of energy systems
through higher diversity. They also make total
energy supply, the energy mix and energy trade
less dependent upon the variations in economic
growth and resource availability, and thus more
predictable and possibly easier to manage.
Climate policies may also entail certain
risks for energy security. In particular, deep
penetration of solar energy in the electricity
sector or biofuels in the liquid fuels sector may
reduce the diversity of these energy systems by

the end of the century (particularly under high
economic growth and low fossil fuel assumptions). This may be especially pronounced in
regions which will be using their ‘competitive’
resources rather than relying on the global mix
of tradable fuels. Another risk is a moderate
increase in trade and import dependency in
some fossil fuels in the short- to medium-term
when climate policies supress exploration of
coal and non-conventional oil. Finally, there is
a risk of declining export revenues of energyexporting regions, but for the main energyexporting regions this is less pronounced, especially in the medium-term, due to continued
demand for conventional oil and gas.

(a) Oil trade in REMIND

(b) Oil trade in WITCH

Global energy trade in
baseline and climate
policy scenarios under
different economic
growth assumptions.
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Each of the uncertainties explored in the
RoSE project ( population, income, and fossil
fuel resource availability ) has implications for
land use, in addition to the implications for
energy and mitigation. The availability and
cost of extracting fossil fuel resources has
an impact on the terrestrial system through
the production and use of bioenergy. When
fossil fuels are scarce or expensive, bioenergy
serves as a substitute for coal and gas in the
electricity sector, and for oil in the refinery
sector, both with and without climate policy.
As a result, more land is devoted to bioenergy
production at the expense of forest cover. This
results in lower energy system emissions and
higher land-use change emissions. Under a climate policy, higher resource prices serve as a

complement to carbon prices, leading to lower
carbon prices when fossil fuels are scarce.
Increases in population and income can
have a significant impact on emissions via
increased strain on land and associated
land-use emissions. Even if high population
scenarios are coupled with low growth of
per capita income, such that total economic
output is lower than a medium population,
medium growth scenario, cumulative land-use
change emissions can be more than as 45%
higher ( Figure 15 ). The increase in competition for land and land-use change emissions
have implications for the cost of mitigation, as
more mitigation is required and the potential
for land-based mitigation ( e.g. afforestation,
bioenergy ) options are reduced.

(a) Bioenergy land cover

(b) Forest land cover
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Figure 1 5
(a) Bioenergy land cover,
(b) forest land cover,
(c) CO 2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion
and industry ( FF&I ) and
(d) CO 2 emissions from
land use change in
baseline scenarios.

Population, economic growth
and fossil fuel scarcity all have
implications for land use

Bioenergy Land Cover [million km2]

6.2

31

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

2020

2040

2060

2080

40.5
40
39.5
39
38.5
38

2100

2020

2040

Year

(c) CO 2 emissions from FF&I

CO2 FF&I Emissions [GTCO2/yr]

CO2 FF&I Emissions [GTCO2/yr]

2100

6

80
70
60
50
40
30
20

2080

(d) CO 2 emissions from land use change

90
2100

2060

Year

2020

2040

2060

Year

2080

2100

Fast
Defa
Slow
High

5
4
3
2
1
0
−1

2020

2040

2060

Year

2080

2100

32

6.3

Sectoral perspectives

Economic growth and fossil fuel
scarcity can both stimulate
green investments
Economic growth stimulates green investments, as more resources become available to
invest in clean energy and innovation options
( renewables, energy efficiency ), but it also
increases investment in conventional, fossil
technologies. High economic and/or population
growth exerts a pressure on energy demand,
raising the relative prices of energy to capital.
The change in relative prices induces a more
efficient use of energy resources, mostly via
capital-energy substitution.
Faster convergence across countries also
leads to a more efficient use of energy inputs
globally. On the one hand, faster convergence
increases aggregate energy intensity by raising
the weight of energy intensive developing
countries. On the other hand, faster convergence improves the use of energy resources via
efficiency R&D and capital-energy substitution.
This second effect prevails, and overall energy
intensity is lower when convergence is faster.
High fossil fuel prices create an economic
opportunity for decarbonizing the energy mix
even in the absence of a climate policy.
In particular, oil scarcity can provide incentives
to invest in invention and deployment of a clean

substitute to oil on a large scale. When fossil
fuel resources are expected to become scarce
throughout the century, ample financial
resources ( in the order of 40 billion USD  /  yr as
estimated in the WITCH model ) will be redirected
to R&D projects aimed at developing viable new
energy sources ( Figure 16 ). Developed countries
will provide between half and two third of
the global financial flows to R&D programs.
The availability of cheap gas resources would
increase gas investments, mostly to substitute
coal in coal-intensive countries. Yet, it would
only marginally displace investments in renewables and clean energy innovation. The R&D
sector would continue to attract on the order of
10% of total energy investments.
Although economic growth and fossil fuel
prices can create an economic opportunity for
more investments in non-fossil energy technologies and clean energy R&D, those investments
do not induce emission reductions compatible
with climate stabilization objectives. Only the
simultaneous expectation of oil, gas, and coal
scarcity could set the per capita emission-GDP
relationship on a path that mimics a scenario
with moderate and fragmented climate policies.
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Figure 1 6
Annual average
investments throughout
the century.
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